New year, ancient cliche

 

Although we in Pakistan are already prepared for issues that have been around for more than a few months, a new year has begun. This was made clear by the new army chief's Sunday newspaper statement in which he referred to the nazuk morr the nation was in.

We appear to have remained at the same nazuk morr for decades. That is, in Urdu; Pakistan was frequently depicted in English as being at a crossroads, looking either left or right. Yet, this isn't even the seriously stressing part. Sincerely, the most important inquiry is, "Why are we still here?" Is it really bad traffic? Is the vehicle stuck? Or are we simply unable to negotiate the turn?

Similar to the Day of Judgment, it appears as though our nazuk dilemma can only be resolved by higher powers. The only thing that can be said for the other people who are stuck here is that we need to think more deeply.

When the army chief talked about the nazuk moments, he probably was thinking about two of our biggest headaches, which is an understatement of the scale of the problems: terrorism and the economy.

Our dilemma seems to require only the assistance of higher forces.

The public debate may be the laziest and least knowledgeable when it comes to both.

Take terrorism as an example: we haven't really talked about it enough since 2008. We only know that the military-led operations were successful. Questions about how, why, and what didn't work with them are rarely asked and never answered.

Beyond the use of force, the National Action Plan, a one-page moment that never evolved into anything else, offered a grand hope. We never got around to determining whether the single page required additional information to become fully developed, detailed plans. All of a sudden, we began negotiations with the TTP last year. Despite what the "sources" of the well-informed assert, no one really knows what or who was behind the idea of negotiations with the TTP. So, we have to speculate about whether it was the institution or Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed's idea, and why.

In addition, the reasons for the resurgence are poorly understood. It does not help to explain everything to simply harp on about the space the TTP has found in Afghanistan to thrive and use as a staging ground to target Pakistan. If all the militants wanted was freedom of movement in Afghanistan, what does the expensive fence we built accomplish? Also, may we inquire about the protesting people of Swat, who were concerned about the militants they were seeing once more among them? What brought them back?

Before we jump into finding a consensus for the operations, we should try to answer these questions. Because the responses might just assist in pointing us in the direction of a comprehensive policy rather than individual efforts.

The economy is the second issue that is causing our never-ending stop at the crossroads, and it may be equally significant. However, in contrast to militancy, the issue here is not ignorance but deliberate ignorance.

The issue lies in our boom-and-bust cycles, in which imports fuel the boom and bring us to the IMF, whose programs cause a bust. The answer is long-term reforms that would enable growth that is more sustainable. These reforms would include, among other things, encouraging exports and reducing domestic consumption as well as the real estate market. This has been said by every economist, including the dozen or so who give presentations at the most significant altar.

However, it is not put into action because no one wants to make such difficult decisions.

As a result, we like to act as though we don't know the answers. As an aside, it is fascinating that we believe we know how to deal with militancy, which is much more difficult to deal with, but not the economy, where solutions may be more obvious.)

As a result, we argued for four years that Miftah Ismail was incapable of managing the nitty-gritty before concluding that it was the PTI's incompetence (and that Asad Umar did not know what he was doing or that Hafeez Shaeikh was the IMF's man). We insist that consensus, a charter of economy, and a unity government are necessary to resolve the issues now that we have no miracle worker to fly in (even Ishaq Dar's experience has failed). Our obsession with incompetence, which dominated Rawalpindi and our media from 2018 to October 2022, is about as nuanced as this idea of a consensus. It simply reveals our erroneous beliefs about putting people ahead of policies.

And since the charter of economy or consensus is now so widely accepted, no one bothers to inquire whether the various factions currently in power are in agreement on what we require consensus on. Are the PML-N and PPP on the same page regarding privatizing state-owned businesses like PIA and Steel Mills? What should be agreed upon regarding energy issues? For instance, if the solution calls for transferring DISCOs to the provinces, how will this be accomplished? Or, in the face of their own sugar daddy and the defense housing societies, how will political parties find the courage to tax real estate?

All tough questions. Perhaps this is why it is so much simpler to simply wax poetic about economic charters and unity governments. It bears some resemblance to the 2002 neocon plans to remake Iraq. Many people thought the concept was good on paper, but it didn't work out that way.

Our ability to cross this nazuk morr necessitates far less clichés and a great deal more honesty and reflection. However, we only have a surplus of the latter. As we look around the intersection, the abrupt shift to making serious decisions is still hard to see. The beginning of the new year doesn't look very good.