Investigating Climate Diplomacy

 In recent years, countries like Pakistan which are surrounded by a challenging security environment and a changing climate have made climate diplomacy an important topic.

It has helped Pakistan re-engage with the global community, project its gentler image, leverage its soft power, develop a business case for the country, and broker a global consensus to support climate-vulnerable countries, as recently observed at the 27th climate summit in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt.

Is there anything South Asia can learn from Pakistan?

Climate diplomacy has developed its own characteristics over time that are distinct from those of conventional diplomacy. The latter has historically relied on surprise, suspicion, and secrecy. It is frequently characterized by win-lose relationships subject to zero-sum calculations. In addition, covert and overt actions, as well as intelligence (with a capital "I"), technology, weapon systems, and military strategy are the foundations of traditional diplomacy. Crisis management techniques are used to maintain system stability and predictability in relationships in the interest of maintaining stable relationships.

 On the other hand, climate diplomacy is expanding in scope and complexity. It has developed into a distinct subfield of diplomacy that defies a number of conventional rules. By embracing all nontraditional security threats, it seeks regional cooperation. In point of fact, the application of the ever-evolving principles of climate diplomacy to nontraditional threats is made possible by regional cooperation. Or, to put it another way, nontraditional security threats make it possible for regional cooperation in a way that traditional security rarely does. Traditional approaches to dealing with climate change may be counterproductive. Regional cooperation can thrive with unconventional responses.

Additionally, nontraditional threats and regional cooperation are rarely entirely domestic or interstate. Issues related to the climate cross national, regional, and international boundaries.

The climate summit gave Pakistan the chance to lead a group of 134 countries, including formal subgroups like the 46 Least Developed Countries and the 40 Small Island Developing Countries, as chair of the Group of 77 with China. Pakistan also worked with a lot of groups that overlap, like the Climate Vulnerability Forum, which is made up of 58 countries and includes 46 African nations, and V-20, which is an alliance made up of the 20 most vulnerable countries, including neighboring Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal.

Faith in prolonged involvement in intricate processes is the driving force behind climate diplomacy.

Pakistan, as chair of the G-77 with China, brought the US, EU, China, and India, the world's largest economies and emitters, to the table. This was a remarkable feat for a nation that otherwise has a foreign policy focused on India and has put other international engagements on the sidelines since the 1992 Rio Summit, when Jamsheed Marker, Pakistan's able chairman, was in charge of the G-77 and China. Pakistan has gained exposure to novel, ground-breaking strategies for regional climate diplomacy through its climate diplomacy experience.

By avoiding zero-sum calculations and developing win-win options, climate diplomacy has evolved, as evidenced by numerous multilateral environmental and climate agreements.

Most importantly, climate diplomacy is based on the belief that people will stay involved in complicated processes for a long time. The latest scientific information is always available to everyone in the open space of the knowledge marketplace. It has devised novel strategies for interacting with a variety of stakeholders, including civil society organizations (CSOs), universities, the private sector, entrepreneurs, women, children, and indigenous people, among others, and has utilized the inventiveness of these stakeholders to avoid negotiation impasse.

In South Asia, a new set of nontraditional security threats has emerged, redefining the India-Pakistan relationship. While we continue to struggle with the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and arbitrary interpretations of the Indus Waters Treaty, regional cooperation and its scope are at a crossroads. The list of unconventional threats to security is constantly growing. It is currently topped by changes in river flows, poor air quality that has engulfed Delhi and Lahore, shifting monsoon and rainfall trends, cloudbursts that cause cross-border flash floods, and other factors.

The new issues that require space on our bilateral agenda are the long-term trends of seawater intrusion, tropical storms, droughts and desertification, epidemics and pandemics, transborder migration, and regional refugees. The border trade of fruits, vegetables, and some commodities has become more of a climate risk management issue than a simple political one due to the frequency of disasters caused by climate change. As the global temperature rises further, to 1.5 degrees Celsius and beyond, these issues will become more severe.

Since 2007, the UN Security Council has started to acknowledge that climate change threatens international peace and security. In UNSC resolutions 2348, 1325, and 2331, it has accepted a number of nontraditional threats that are rooted in disputes over water, ecosystems, and environmental issues. These threats include the Lake Chad Basin crisis, women's vulnerability in conflicts, human trafficking, and others. Conflicts like the Sudan war in Darfur (since 2003), the Somali civil war (2009), the Nigerian insurgency (2009), the Syrian civil war (2011), and the conflict in Mali are seen by the UNSC as having new dimensions brought about by the climate crisis. In point of fact, climate change was blamed for public unrest that occurred in 2011 and 2017 following flooding in Thailand and Myanmar. There are no reliable studies that link prolonged droughts to unrest in Afghanistan and Balochistan.

Pakistan's floods this year are evidence of the widespread monsoon disruptions that have begun, and it is in the ultimate strategic interest of both Pakistan and India to agree to do everything in their power to maintain a 1.5°C global temperature rise. Pakistan must engage with India and China, the second and third largest emitters in the world, both individually and collectively prior to COP28 in Dubai next year.

The momentum that was established at Sharm El Sheikh cannot be sustained in the future with the current inadequate capacities of the institutions. In the "whole government," particularly in the climate, foreign, planning, finance, and sectoral ministries, a clear strategic understanding must be strengthened. Pakistan has this chance to establish institutional mechanisms for engaging India and other neighbors in climate diplomacy.

Climate diplomacy has moved beyond the UNFCCC processes, as evidenced by the global discourse on carbon markets and trading, carbon capture and sequestration, the shift toward vehicles with non-combustion engines and long-lasting batteries, the phase out of coal and fossil fuels, and blue and green hydrogen energy. To paraphrase: Stupid, it's about the economy.'