A new Afghan Policy

 

Pakistan can let Afghan female students finish their degrees in Pakistan because the Taliban have banned their education. After its recent disappointments with the Taliban regime, this would make it possible for the nation to begin a new Afghan policy, which it desperately requires.

Pakistan's Afghan policy has remained strategic-focused, necessitating a complete overhaul. A more extensive engagement with the Afghan people and the ruling regime ought to be the primary focus of a new Afghan policy. In the recent past, civilian and military leaders made exaggerated claims regarding the incorporation of geoeconomic considerations into the country's priorities for its foreign policy. However, in reality, the design as a whole remained geostrategic in nature. This is due to the simplistic view that both are detrimental to one another. However, because geopolitics and geoeconomics are not distinct entities at all, a state can adjust both within its vision.

Pakistan's security problems have gotten worse as a result of the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan. The fact that Afghanistan has not yet received the cooperation it had anticipated from the Taliban has frustrated the policymakers. The state institutions must approach the Taliban with cooperation.

At least in the near future, the Taliban will not vanish from the scene because they are a reality. Through economic cooperation and participation, they intend to increase their political capital in the region. However, they will continue to face new domestic and international challenges as a result of their policies toward women, political and ethnic opposition, and terrorist networks. Depending on their attitude and internal consensus, they have equal chances of bringing about order or disorder in the country over the medium to long term. Pakistan may not have much left to guide or advise the Taliban right now. A new strategy should include face-to-face interaction and practical cooperation.

Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan must be delicate and not based on appeasement or hostility. A hostile approach could exacerbate the animosity between the two parties, and if the Taliban regime is successful in restoring order, it could return Afghanistan to its pre-terrorist state. The Taliban have the full potential to revert to an insurgent movement and begin spreading terrorism worldwide if they become weaker. Pakistan would be the first affected nation in the worst-case scenario.

The Afghan Taliban have a support base in the regions bordering Afghanistan, in addition to the TTP, which is their closest ally. The TTP's desire to establish a tribal emirate in their manner is supported by numerous commanders within the Taliban. What should Pakistan do in such a complicated situation? The TTP and border security issues will be addressed directly by the state, as the National Security Committee has correctly predicted. It is unnecessary to reiterate that Pakistan should not allow the Taliban to dictate that the TTP is the country's internal problem; however, political leaders and commentators should refrain from making hostile statements regarding the Taliban. Such statements complicate the process of bilateral engagement and raise the threat of terrorism. Additionally, the state must refrain from expressing any desire to resume negotiations with the TTP because doing so demonstrates its weakness.

Border security, counterterrorism, economic cooperation, joint transnational engagements, and people-to-people contacts are the five essential components of a cooperation-based strategy. The policy needs to be constantly reviewed, and all of these parts should work together.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) is a bilateral engagement formula that Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed upon in 2018 for the security and counterterrorism components. The initiative's primary goal was to effectively deal with fugitives and irreconcilable elements that posed a threat to either country's security. Apart from avoiding blame games, the two nations agreed to refrain from aerial or other violations of the other's territory.

Although it is understandable that neither side strictly implemented APAPPS at the time, the situation with the Taliban regime is different, and the initiative can be reworked following the Doha Agreement between the Taliban and the US. The Pakistani establishment's long-held desire for bilateral and transnational economic engagement must be justified in light of shifting geopolitics.

People-to-people contact, on the other hand, ought to be an essential part of the policy, and it ought to be based on something other than the conventional gist of religious, cultural, and historical ties between the two nations. The component ought to be developed within a framework of practical cooperation and confidence-boosting measures between the citizens of the two countries. Afghan students would not experience a cultural shock if universities in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa offered education to female students. The new public universities in neighboring areas can effectively handle the situation. It will have a number of benefits, including improving Pakistan's international image and meeting the financial needs of the ailing public universities. In a similar vein, it is crucial for both sides to rethink the concept of establishing medical cities and trade centers along the border. In addition to numerous other advantages, it will assist Afghan citizens in obtaining improved health facilities and reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations in these areas.

The most important thing is that formal diplomatic, political, and strategic channels should be used for bilateral engagement, not tribal elders or religious scholars. Only for confidence-building purposes can the clergy and tribal connections be utilized, and their formal involvement in any security-related matter must be avoided. Among them are supporters of the TTP and other militant groups, who typically support them over the state.

Within the Taliban and beyond, there should not be any political favorites for the policy.

Who ought to formulate the new Afghan policy? Although the current state of the parliament is well-known, it would merely serve as a rubber stamp for the establishment, the idea that parliament should take the lead in policymaking is frequently promoted. Political parties, civil society, and security agencies all require more in-depth consultation.