The TTP and Pakistan relationship

 Today, I'm sharing an article about TTP and Pakistan.

The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), a think tank based in Islamabad, published its annual "Pakistan Security Report 2022" on January 7. The security situation in 2021 and 2022 were compared in the report. The TTP remained rooted in Afghanistan, according to the report, providing the organization with the necessary leeway to play a significant role in Pakistani violence. Additionally, the TTP is a major source of contention between Islamabad and the Kabul-based government of the Afghan Taliban.

It is entirely accurate to assert that the TTP has not only sought refuge in Afghanistan's territory but also in the ideology of the Afghan Taliban. It appears that the TTP depends on the Afghan Taliban for its survival. Here, it is assumed that the Afghan Taliban do not intend to promote or carry out terrorist attacks to destabilize Pakistan. The TTP, on the other hand, does so on its own and without the permission of the Afghan Taliban, its host.

In spite of this presumption of dissociation, the TTP and the Afghan Taliban share two main points of convergence: first, the question of whether the Durand Line is legitimate; secondly, the issue of the Islamic (Shariah) ideology. Therefore, contrary to the assertion made in the report, it is difficult for Pakistan to reach out to the Afghan Taliban by avoiding the TTP.

The Afghan Taliban's position on the Durand Line is very similar to that of King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1947. The King was the most vocal proponent of the Pashtunistan issue, to Pakistan's detriment. The Afghan Taliban, despite supporting the desire to reclaim the lost (ethnic) territory, do not explicitly advocate for the issue. Irredentism, whether or not it is realizable, brings the TTP closer to the Afghan Taliban. However, the primary aggravating factor is the recent resentment among Pashtun youth in Pakistan's (previous) tribal belt.

Pakistan's efforts to negotiate peace with the TTP after August 15, 2021, are condemned by the report as an act of weakness. The report also states that the TTP has been encouraged to regroup and increase terrorist violence in Pakistan as a result of the negotiations. The report combines the flexibility of declared conditions with the advantages of negotiations in this instance. That is, the report believes that the state's stance will naturally change as a result of negotiations. In addition, the versatility has been allowing the TTP to restore its offenses against Pakistan. This might not be true.

Negotiations are a method for gaining the participants' attention and persuading them of the state's position in order to reduce the likelihood of bloodshed. Maintaining an army does not necessitate putting it through conflict after conflict. As a prerequisite for conflict, negotiations become more important the more benighted and ignorant the opponent is. It is dangerous to underestimate the significance of negotiations. The premise is as follows: Before resorting to force, always give negotiations a chance.

It is entirely accurate to assert that the TTP has not only sought refuge in Afghanistan's territory but also in the ideology of the Afghan Taliban. It appears that the TTP depends on the Afghan Taliban for its survival.

Additionally, the report states that the TTP should not solely be dealt with by security agencies. Instead, according to the report, the issue ought to be discussed in parliament, which is the center of collective decision-making, needs to lead counterterrorism efforts, and needs to develop a clear stance on terrorism and extremism. It is accurate.

A buffer ought to exist between the target organization and the security agencies. The lack of such a pad increases the likelihood of collateral damage, which has led to retaliation and an even wider conflict. It is never a good idea to undervalue the value of human life.

The TTP has been driven off Pakistani soil. The TTP is well aware that the Pakistani army can launch operations again if it has done so in the past. Despite this understanding, if the TTP has reactivated, it is necessary to investigate the causes thoroughly.

When the former COAS, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, retired, he suggested to the parliament that legislation be passed to safeguard prisoners held in internment camps. There was outrage at the proposal. One is reminded that these detainees cannot be held in custody for an extended period of time without a legal justification by the incident that occurred on December 18 in Bannu, in which more than thirty members of the TTP held officers of a CTD police station hostage. A source of resentment in the TTP must be prolonged illegal captivity, which has led to a recent increase in terrorist attacks. If the State is dealing with TTP prisoners in a legal manner, it is necessary to conduct introspection whenever there is a need to condemn the TTP.

Contrary to the assertion made in the report, the Afghan Taliban are not likely to get involved in border skirmishes with Pakistani security forces across the Durand Line in regards to fencing the line, except in very rare instances. The explanation is easy: They need Pakistan's assistance to demonstrate to the world that their rule over Kabul is legitimate. The world, particularly the United States, may not be able to recognize the Afghan Taliban government if Pakistan becomes hostile toward them.

The Afghan Taliban have openly supported the TTP's plans to attack Pakistan and have been reluctant to challenge Pakistan. However, a concerning development has occurred. Ned Price, spokesman for the US State Department, responded to a question on January 4 during a press briefing by stating that Pakistan had the right to defend itself against terrorism because the country had suffered greatly from terrorist attacks.

The statement is ominous because it allows Pakistan to follow the TTP in hot pursuit inside Afghanistan, where there is no legal government, and may even encourage Pakistan to do so. The Afghan Taliban may become hostile toward Pakistan as a result of any such act by Pakistani security forces. Pakistan must first weigh the benefits and drawbacks of harming the TTP inside Afghanistan before responding to its actions.