The deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran's three possible outcomes

 The meeting that took place on Thursday in Beijing between the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers was a significant step on an unanticipated path that may result in a level of regional stability that has not been seen in over 40 years.

The fact that it took place less than a month after the Beijing agreement on Walk 10 is further evidence of Chinese proficiency and the two players' commitment to moving forward.On Thursday, the two nations were addressed by their unfamiliar priests, indicating that the two initiatives are certain of the arrangement and have now given the specifics to the relevant government bodies. Ali Shamkhani, a two-star general and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mosaed Al-Aiban, a very high-ranking Saudi royal court adviser and one of the crown prince's most trusted right-hand men, both attended the signing of the initial agreement. My understanding is that this was done in response to the Kingdom's insistence, which disarmed skeptics who claimed the deal may have been agreed upon by the Iranian Foreign Ministry but not by the Iranian deep state or security apparatus; Tehran is left with no choice but to claim that the deal was not supported by everyone in the regime—not that anyone believes in a true separation of powers, but this is an argument that has been used in the past.

Over the course of the past month, I have been asked numerous times how likely it is that the Tehran system will adhere to the arrangement. That can only be addressed by senior officials in Tehran. One thing I do know is that a deal can quickly break down, as any skilled negotiator will tell you.

In terms of their patience, Iranian negotiators are frequently compared to Persian carpet weavers. They have consistently played for time while conversing with Saudi Arabia or Western countries. In the Saudi case, they exploited the way that all of our rulers have been of advanced age subsequent to consenting to the special position, so the Iranians acknowledged it was unavoidable before they expected to deal with one more organization for whom they wouldn't be essential until they set their home up. When dealing with Western democracies, Iran was aware that elected leaders change every few years. Tehran only had to withstand the most intense campaign of pressure launched by Trump during Biden's transition to the White House until Trump arrived determined to revive the Iran nuclear deal, at which point they could demand concessions.

The good news is that the agreement that was signed on March 10 with Beijing's sponsorship is unaffected by any of this. This arrangement is special since it utilizes "two-factor validation," which includes China and Crown Sovereign Mohammed receptacle Salman on one hand.

The young, dynamic, and empowered crown prince maintains internal stability and foreign policy continuity for decades to come, allowing the relevant officials to concentrate on every aspect of the deal until it is completed. Iran, on the other hand, cannot wriggle out of the agreement because it was mediated by China rather than the United States. This is because the Washington administration may not have the support of both parties in Congress and will, in any case, leave after its term ends.

In addition, this is China's first public display as a peacemaker and a test of its global dominance. The Chinese dragon will, in my opinion, be squeezing Tehran to ensure that the deal is adhered to because China is Iran's largest trading partner and has pledged $300 billion in investment over 25 years.

Does this then imply that success is guaranteed? However, it never is in politics. However, there are three possible outcomes.

The most bleak scenario is Iran's refusal to abide by the agreement. That would not only be very bad for regional peace, but it would also mean that Tehran would have upset China, one of Iran's only two global friends. Russia, on the other hand, has a lot on its plate right now. Saudi Arabia, which has fought Iran's destabilizing activities and militias for over 40 years, would simply be returning to the status quo.

The most likely and attainable scenario is for the deal to progress slowly but surely. The Houthi militia in Yemen, backed by Iran, offered to extend the truce for six months on Thursday, which is encouraging. It already includes a commitment to refraining from aggression or supporting aggression. The two territorial powers will actually want to talk straightforwardly and utilize strategic means to help significant state run administrations in accomplishing steadiness and the most ideal results in unstable districts like Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria once discretionary missions are reestablished.

The most rosy scenario is for us to all wake up one day and discover that Iran's withdrawal from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as every other regional conflict with Iran, has been resolved. However, given the sheer volume of Iranian investments and interests ingrained in these nations, this is unlikely.

However, from a Saudi perspective, this appears to have been an unmistakable win up until this point, not only for the kingdom but also for the district, global business sectors, and energy security.